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COMMENTS
The Malfunction Theory: A Feasible
Means to Prove a Defect in Strict
Products Liability
I. Introduction
Products liability law greatly affects the quality of products
marketed today.' Technological advancements and mass production
provide the consumer with a variety of products ranging from a sim-
ple glass bottle to a complex computerized car or an intricate piece
of machinery. If defective, a glass bottle may shatter and cause ex-
tensive damage, just as a machine may malfunction and harm the
operator. Products liability law strives to accommodate plaintiffs in-
jured by defective products.' Many of the developments in products
liability law result from increased societal concern over the relation-
ship between the product's consumer, manufacturer, and seller.3
Because actions based upon breach of warranty and negligence
often do not adequately accommodate an injured plaintiff, many ju-
risdictions' apply strict liability in tort, which conforms with section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.5 Strict liability, how-
l. See 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) T 59 (Jan. 8, 1988).
2. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 677-715 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
3. The increasing complexity of products and manufacturing processes influenced courts
to lessen the plaintiff's burden of proof so that sellers and manufacturers, rather than consum-
ers, will bear the costs of injuries. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337
A.2d 893 (1975).
4. The federal government has expressed concern that products liability law varies from
state to state. The United States House of Representatives recently proposed legislation that
would provide uniformity in products liability law to reduce the inefficiency and expense that
results from developing the law on a case-by-case basis. The proposed legislation would create
federal standards for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. It would also provide
guidelines for defensive measures and standards of care. H.R. REP. No. 100-748, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. I, at 17, 18 (1988).
5. J. ALLEE, PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2.01 (1988).
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ever, does not always substantially benefit the plaintiff. A plaintiff
alleging strict liability must still prove a defect in the product.'
Often, proving a defect is practically impossible either because the
plaintiff is unable to point to a specific defect in the product or be-
cause the intricacies of the product are beyond the plaintiff's
comprehension .'
In an attempt to reduce the plaintiff's problems, courts have be-
gun to allow plaintiffs to use evidence of the malfunction of the prod-
uct itself to create an inference that the product was defective. Penn-
sylvania is the forerunner in implementing this approach, which is
termed the malfunction theory.' Although other jurisdictions formu-
lated similar theories,9 Pennsylvania defined the malfunction theory
and restricted its use. Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
grappled with the issue of whether the malfunction theory applies in
cases involving alternative theories of liability. In Rogers v. Johnson
& Johnson Products, Inc.,10 a plaintiff who was burned when physi-
cians applied a plaster cast to his leg alleged negligence and strict
liability, claiming that the plaster was defective." By proving that
the product malfunctioned, the plaintiff established a defect under
the malfunction theory.' 2 The court did not directly confront the is-
sue of whether establishing a prima facie case in negligence pre-
cludes the implementation of the malfunction theory in strict liabil-
ity, as the two theories appear to be inconsistent in regard to
required elements of proof.'" Rather, the court focused on the spe-
cific facts of Rogers and held that if the plaintiff's case-in-chief sat-
isfies the strictures of the malfunction theory, the plaintiff's burden
of proof is satisfied.' 4
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
7. The plaintiff's attempt to point to a specific defect is complicated when no eyewit-
nesses to the accident survive, as in the case of an allegedly defective automobile, or when the
product is comprised of many different components, each of which, if defective, could have
caused the malfunction.
8. Although the malfunction theory has been a viable legal theory in Pennsylvania for
several years, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania only recently recognized this evidentiary
approach'to infer a defect in the manufacturing process. See Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson
Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751, 754 (Pa. 1989).
9. States utilizing a malfunction theory or a similar approach include: Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, and Ore-
gon. See infra notes 82, 115.
10. 565 A.2d 751 (1989).
I. Id. at 753.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 755. The court does not
agree with the Superior Court's tacit conclusion that a plaintiff who has
presented a malfunction case will always be precluded from proceeding upon an
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This Comment discusses the malfunction theory, and its imple-
mentation by various jurisdictions. This Comment then focuses on
the requisite elements of proof under the doctrine, and determines
how the doctrine might change the plaintiff's burden of proof. The
restrictions and limitations of the theory are also discussed. Further,
this Comment analyzes the various limitations and restrictions of the
theory and evaluates its viability.
II. Traditional Theories of Liability in Products Liability Law
Products liability contemplates the liability of those "who sup-
ply goods or products for the use of others to purchasers, users, and
bystanders for losses of various kinds resulting from so-called defects
in those products."'" Legal scholars recognize three distinct causes of
action by which an injured plaintiff 6 may recover from a manufac-
turer or seller of a harmful product. Suppliers of a defective product
may be liable under modern tort law for negligence, breach of war-
ranty, or strict liability."
A. Negligence
Negligence is one of the oldest theories in products liability
law.' 8 The traditional elements of negligence must be proved in a
products liability claim sounding in negligence.' 9 The plaintiff must
show that the manufacturer owed him a duty; that the manufacturer
alternate theory of negligence. It is altogether possible that a plaintiff's injuries
could be caused jointly by a defective product and also by third party negligence
so long as the negligence does not constitute a supervening cause of the
malfunction.
Id. at 755 n.6. See also infra notes 133-57 and accompanying text.
15. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 677.
16. There are at least five different types of losses that a purchaser or consumer may
incur. These are: (I) personal injuries; (2) physical harm to tangible things, other than the
assembled product; (3) physical harm to or destruction of the assembled product purchased by
the first purchaser for use; (4) physical harm or destruction to a product repaired with or one
made with the use of component parts; and (5) direct economic loss stemming from the
purchase of an inferior product and indirect consequential loss. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 2, at 678.
17. Id. at 694. A plaintiff injured by a defective product has three separate actions by
which he may recover from the supplier of a defective product: negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability. D. DRUSSEL & J. WADE, PLAINTIFF'S PROOF OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE § 15.1
(1982). It is interesting to note that the House of Representatives categorized the plaintiff's
possible causes of action differently. The House established the following three causes of action
under which a manufacturer may be liable: (1) negligence; (2) strict liability; and (3) inten-
tional wrongdoing, H.R. REP. No. 100-748, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 30 (1988).
18. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 761 (1988).
19. The following are elements of a cause of action in negligence: (1) Duty or standard
of conduct; (2) breach of the duty; (3) breach must bear a causal connection to plaintiff's
injury; and (4) an injury must have occurred. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 164.
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breached the duty; and that the breach was a cause in fact and a
proximate cause2" of the plaintiff's injury.21 Specifically, in a prod-
ucts liability case the plaintiff must prove that the product was de-
fective, that the defective product injured the plaintiff, and that the
manufacturer failed to exercise due care.2 The rule in negligence is
that "the seller is liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale of
any product which may reasonably be expected to be capable of in-
flicting substantial harm if it is defective. ' 23 A substantial body of
law evolved permitting plaintiffs to recover for negligent manufac-
ture, failure to warn, inadequate warnings, failure to inspect or test,
and for negligence that enhanced the injury.24
The negligence theory is primarily based on fault, although
proof of a defect plays an important role. In negligence, a defect in
the product is defined as an abnormality or an unintended condition
that makes the product more dangerous than intended. 5 Sometimes
it is difficult for the plaintiff to specify the cause of the injury. Re-
cently, courts invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in products
liability negligence cases. 2" Res ipsa loquitur is a theory of circum-
stantial evidence that allows the jury to infer negligence when the
specific cause of the injury is unknown, the injury ordinarily would
not occur without negligence, and the defendant had exclusive con-
trol of the instrumentality. 7 Whether or not res ipsa is used, the
defendant may invoke traditional defenses to negligence. 8 Courts
20. In products liability litigation a plaintiff must establish cause in fact as well as legal
or proximate cause. Cause in fact is "but for" causation, and means that but for the negligent
conduct the harmful result would not have occurred. A causal connection between the negli-
gence and the injury is therefore established. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note
18, at 751. Legal or proximate cause is a determination that "the nexus between the wrongful
act (or omissions) and the injury sustained is of such a nature that it is socially and economi-
cally desirable to hold the wrongdoer liable." Id.
21. "Some courts would analyze the elements of an action more finely, listing them as:
(I) duty; (2) general standard of care; (3) specific standard of care; (4) cause in fact; (5) legal
or proximate cause; and (6) damage: There is no requirement of proof that damages resulted
from a sudden, violent event." Id. at 762.
22. Id.
23. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 683.
24. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 1.02; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at
684.
25. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 695.
26. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 1.02.
27. Many courts still apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when there is no technical
control by the defendant. "Exclusive control is merely one fact which establishes the responsi-
bility of the defendant; and if it can be established otherwise, exclusive control is not essential
to a res ipsa loquitur case." Id. at § 9.02(1).
28. If the product conforms to the state of the art, or the defendant can adequately show
that it had no knowledge of the danger, or that it had no reason to have such knowledge, the
plaintiff's chances of success are limited. Also, contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff can be a defense. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 685; see also J. ALLEE,
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continue to extensively employ the negligence theory today as a
means of recovery in products liability cases."
B. Breach of Warranty
In products liability cases, breach of warranty is a matter of
both tort and contract law. s0 Thus, liability for breach of warranty
may be limited by applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code." Plaintiffs may allege either breach of an implied warranty or
breach of an express warranty.3 2 A plaintiff alleging either breach of
an express or implied warranty must prove the following elements by
a preponderance of the evidence:-" (1) existence of a warranty; (2)
breach of the warranty; (3) a causal connection between the breach
and the injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the extent of loss caused by
the breach. 4 The plaintiff also must provide sufficient proof that he
complied with the warranty terms.35
Liability based on implied warranty involves breach of the im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular pur-
pose.36 The implied warranty theory is based primarily on contract
law and is less prevalent since the adoption of strict liability in most
jurisdictions.3 "
Breach of express warranty often provides a more effective rem-
edy than either implied warranty or strict liability claims.3 8 Proof of
supra note 5, at § 8.02(1).
29. See, e.g., supra note 14-22 and accompanying text.
30. See 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 18, at 770; Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel: Strict Liability to the Consumer, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966).
31. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to transactions in goods. Appli-
cable sections include: § 2-213, § 2-314, and § 2-315 (product fails to conform to normal
commercial standard); § 2-316 (disclaimers); § 2-317, § 2-718, and § 2-719 (damages); and §
2-607 (time constraints on notification of seller of breach). See 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A.
GANS, supra note 18, at 770.
32. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 678.
33. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 18, at 811. Section 2-607(4) of the
Uniform Commercial Code governs a plaintiff's burden of proof. Id. at 811.
34. See id. at 812.
35. Id.
36. The applicable sections of the Uniform Commercial Code are § 2-314 (implied war-
ranty of merchantability) and § 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
Id. at 790.
37. Breach of implied warranty and strict liability are quite similar in function and ap-
plication. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 677-715; Prosser, supra note
30, at 802.
Implied warranty, however, is still an important cause of action when the plaintiff seeks
Uniform Commercial Code remedies or lets the tort statute of limitations expire. An implied
warranty claim may be appropriate when the plaintiff can establish fitness for a particular
purpose and strict liability does not afford adequate protection. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at §
5.04.
38. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 5.05.
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a product's defective condition is essential in both the implied war-
ranty and strict liability in tort theories. 39 Proof of a defect is not
essential, however, under the breach of express warranty theory. 0
A cause of action for breach of express warranty includes proof
that an express warranty existed, that the warranty was breached,
and that the breach caused the plaintiff's injuries.41 The plaintiff also
must prove the following six elements to make out a prima facie
case: (1) the seller made a promise or an affirmation of fact; (2) the
natural tendency of the affirmation or promise was to induce the
buyer to purchase the product; (3) the promise or affirmation was a
material part of the bargain; (4) the buyer relied on the promise or
affirmation; (5) the seller breached the express warranty; and (6) the
injuries proximately resulted from the seller's breach.4 2 Privity of
contract may not be necessary.'3 The Uniform Commercial Code
limits the application of evidentiary principles and product-related
defenses in breach of express warranty cases." Thus, defenses to a
breach of express warranty claim may be limited.
C. Strict Liability in Tort
Dissatisfaction with negligence and breach of warranty theories
led to the development of a third legal theory in products liability.'3
Courts and legislatures adopted strict liability because negligence
suits failed to provide adequate remedies to consumers injured by
39. See Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325
(1971).
40. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 5.05.
41. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 18, at 811.
42. Id. at 779.
43. Whether privity of contract is necessary for a prima facie case of breach of express
warranty is a jurisdictional matter. Some commentators justify this by alluding to a "built in
requirement" of privity. Privity is "built in" because the manufacturer often communicates an
express warranty to the remote plaintiff through advertising and other means. See J. ALLEE,
supra note 5, at § 5.05(3).
44. The applicable Uniform Commercial Code provision is § 2-313. State versions of §
2-313 are also influential in developing the body of law of express warranty in products liabil-
ity. See J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 5.05(1); see also 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS,
supra note 18, at 777.
The seller is essentially strictly liable for breach of an express warranty. Since proof of
defect is not an essential element of breach of express warranty, the seller is deprived of any
defenses which tend to show that the product was not defective. Defenses such as misuse may
not be viable if it was warranted that the product could be misused in a particular way. J.
ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 5.05(4).
45. "The doctrine of strict liability was created in order to relieve injured consumers
from the problems inherent in pursuing negligence actions and warranty remedies, and to
place the burden of loss on manufacturers rather than the injured persons, who are usually
powerless to protect themselves." D. DRUSSEL & J. WADE, supra note 17, at § 15.3.
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defective products. 6 The adoption of strict liability in tort elimi-
nated the necessity of proving privity or negligence. 47 It is often diffi-
cult or virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prove negligence on the
part of the manufacturer." Drawbacks of attempting to prove a
manufacturer's negligence include problems of proof when a product
is made of various component parts and difficulty in refuting evi-
dence that the manufacturer maintained its duty of care."
Almost every state applies some form of strict liability in tort. 50
As a form of consumer protection, strict liability provides an incen-
tive for manufacturers to produce the safest possible products. 5 The
strict liability doctrine is a manifestation of the judicial belief that
the law should afford the maximum protection of both health and
safety to the consumer, and that the manufacturer of a defective
product should compensate injured victims.52 Courts adopted strict
liability specifically for purposes of expanding the system of victim
compensation and enhancing risk distribution.5"
There are three primary policy arguments in support of imple-
menting strict liability in tort. First, the costs to injured parties
should be distributed in the most economical manner. Second, the
imposition of strict liability should reduce the number of injuries
caused by defective products by inducing manufacturers to make
better products. Third, the plaintiff's burden of proof under the neg-
ligence and warranty theories is often costly and extremely difficult
46. Note, Proof of Defect in a Strict Products Liability Case, 22 ME. L. REV. 189
(1970).
47. D. DRUSSEL & J. WADE, supra note 17, at § 15.1; Prosser, supra note 30, at 840.
48. D. DRUSSEL & J. WADE, supra note 17, at § 15.1.
49. Obstacles include: (1) the manufacturer-defendant may not have been negligent but
it is impossible to identify the negligent component part manufacturer; (2) the defect might
have arisen from unknown causes; (3) the inference of negligence might be disproved by a
showing of proper care by the manufacturer; and (4) the plaintiff might not be able to identify
the cause of the defect because of the complexity of the product. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE &
A. GANS, supra note 18, at 719.
50. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 2.01.
51. It is logical to conclude that manufacturers will try harder to produce safe products
if they are held strictly liable for injuries and damages caused by defective products. Certainly,
the threat of potentially devastating jury verdicts gives manufacturers, at the very least, a
strong economic incentive to produce safe products.
52. Manufacturers and sellers of products intended for consumer use should be held to a
special level of responsibility to any consumer injured by their products. The public expects
that the products will live up to their standards. Thus, the plaintiff should not bear the burden
of costs for injuries suffered as a result of a defective product. See Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa.
383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
53. Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures.
Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Lia-
bility, 64 NEB. L. REV. 1, 12 (1985). The problems with proof in negligence and breach of
warranty cases seem to outweigh any concerns that the manufacturers might be exposed to
excessive liability under strict liability in tort.
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to meet."
Strict liability theory focuses on a product's defect rather than a
manufacturer's fault.5 The plaintiff need not impugn the conduct of
the manufacturer or seller; instead, the plaintiff must impugn the
product.56 All but five states follow section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which establishes strict liability in products liabil-
ity law.5 7 Under section 402A the plaintiff must show that the prod-
uct is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," that the
seller is "engaged in the business of selling such a product," and that
the product is "expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change ... "58 Evidence of due care on the
part of the manufacturer is irrelevant.59 To establish a prima facie
case the plaintiff must show: (1) that he was injured by the product;
(2) that the injury occurred because the product was defective and
unreasonably unsafe; and (3) that the defect existed at the time the
product left the manufacturer.6"
54. See id. at 7 (development of strict liability for certain product cases is based on
three policy arguments-economics, incentives for manufacturers, and a relaxed burden of
proof). See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 692. But see J ALLEE, supra note 5,
at § 1.04(l) (suggesting that at least ten justifications exist, including deterrence, risk control,
and powerlessness of the consumer).
55. Strict liability does not require proof of manufacturer fault; it is concerned instead
with proof of a defect in the product. The modern trend is to impose liability when a manufac-
turer places a defective product, intended for consumer use, on the market and a plaintiff is
injured as a result. See D. DRUSSEL & J. WADE, supra note 17, at § 15.3.
56. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 695.
57. The five states that decline to follow § 402A are Michigan, North Carolina, Vir-
ginia, Wyoming, and West Virginia. HR. REP. No. 100-748, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
19 (1988).
58. Section 402A provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if,
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without a
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
59. See id.
60. See Rheingold, supra note 39, at 326; cf. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462
Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (plaintiffs burden of proof involves the following two elements:
(I) proof of defect; and (2) proof that the defect was the proximate cause of the injuries); J.
ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 2.02(1) (the general doctrine of strict liability can be broken down
into seven essential elements). Cf. D. DRUSSEL & J. WADE, supra note 17, at § 15.7 (plaintiff
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A manufacturer may combat a strict liability action by proving
that there was no defect in the product or that the product was im-
properly used.61 Other viable defenses include improper maintenance
or installation, alteration of the product,62 and unreasonable assump-
tion of risk.6"
The most problematic area of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts is defining a defective product to accommodate
both the consumer and the manufacturer.6  Since the Restatement
does not indicate how to prove a defective condition, what type of
evidence is sufficient, or how much evidence is necessary, proof of a
defect or a defective condition in a product is an area of great
concern 65
D. Proof of Defect
Products liability does not make the manufacturer an insurer
against all possible risks of harm or injury resulting from the use of
its products.66 It is essential that every products liability plaintiff
prove the existence of a defect or that a defective condition existed in
the product.6 7
The Restatement provides little guidance in defining defect.
Under section 402A the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
the defective condition existed. 8 Section 402A fails to provide any
must also show that product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial
change in condition).
61. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 8.02.
62. Id. at § 8.02; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 710.
63. The viability of the assumption of risk defense in strict liability cases varies by juris-
diction. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 8.02(2); see also Lonon v. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe &
Jack, 371 Pa. Super. 291, 298, 538 A.2d 22, 25 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff's knowledge
of the defect and subsequent voluntary and unreasonable use was complete defense to strict
liability).
64. The most important question concerns the type and quantum of evidence necessary
to infer a defect. Note, supra note 46, at 190; J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 2.05.
65. Rheingold, supra note 39, at 325. ("Probably more product cases are lost by plain-
tiffs, at trial or on appeal, on the basis that the defect has not been proved, or has not been
connected with the eventual injury, than on any other single basis.")
66. Some products have obvious dangers. Guns, for example, can be dangerous even
when used for the intended purpose, yet courts are reluctant to impose liability on the manu-
facturer. See Taylor v. Gerry's Ridgewood, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d 780, 490 N.E.2d 987 (1986);
Sherek v. Daisy-Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d 615 (1982); see also 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE
& A. GANS, supra note 18, at 514 (strict liability does not make the manufacturer an insurer).
67. In express warranty cases, however, proof of a defect is not essential. See J. ALLEE,
supra note 5, at § 5.05(4). In all other product liability causes of action, proof of defect re-
mains essential, although the amount of proof necessary may vary. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE &
A. GANS, supra note 18, at 519.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965). See also PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 2, at 695 (a product is defective if it subjects persons or tangible
property to an unreasonable risk of harm). Id.
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guidelines as to what type of evidence is necessary or what consti-
tutes sufficient evidence.69 Case law establishes three types of de-
fects. A product may be characterized as defective if it was improp-
erly designed (design defect);7" if there was a mistake in the
manufacturing process (manufacturing defect); 71 or if the consumer
received misleading or inadequate warnings (failure to warn).72
Proof of a defect is often a problem. It is a generally accepted
principle that a plaintiff may utilize circumstantial or direct evidence
to prove a defect or a defective condition. 3 Circumstantial evidence
consists of facts or circumstances that give rise to a reasonable infer-
ence of a defect."' Some courts draw a parallel between proof of a
defect in strict liability and res ipsa loquitur in negligence cases.75
Many courts allow the plaintiff to use a res ipsa approach in prod-
ucts liability cases. 6 Jurisdictions that permit a res ipsa approach in
strict liability cases usually do not require the plaintiff to eliminate
all other possible causes of the accident, but do require that the
plaintiff establish that the defect, which is inferred by res ipsa loqui-
tur, was the most probable cause of the accident.7" A similar ap-
proach to proof of defect in strict liability is the "inference of defect
rule,"78 which allows a jury to infer that the accident could not have
69. "A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and
consumption." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965).
70. See, e.g., Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d 590
(1987); Sweitzer v. Demster Sys., 372 Pa. Super. 449, 539 A.2d 880 (1988).
71. See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Dion v.
Graduate Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., 380 Pa. Super. 416, 520 A.2d 876 (1987).
72. See J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 2.05; 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra
note 18, at 514.
73. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 18, at 521. There is seldom direct
evidence of a defect in a products liability case. Note, supra note 46, at 191.
74. This inference cannot be mere conjecture. Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis For-
warding Co., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d
1347 (1977).
75. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 9.02.
76. Id. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine often implemented in negligence cases. Although
strict products liability does not turn on negligence, the inferences "which are the core of the
[negligence] doctrine remain, and are no less applicable." 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A.
GANS, supra note 18, at 623. But see Note, supra note 46, at 189 (suggesting that using res
ipsa loquitur in products liability cases will not benefit tort law).
77. Plaintiffs burden is to establish that the defect caused the accident by a preponder-
ance of probability. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 18, at 623. Accord
Higgins v. General Motors Corp., 287 Ark. 382, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985); Lang v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 760, 287 S.E.2d 729 (1982).
78. See J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 9.02(2). The basic premise of both the res ipsa
approach and the inference of defect rule is essentially the same. Both function to relax the
plaintiff's burden of proof by expanding the use of circumstantial evidence to infer a defect.
Although the res ipsa approach is more akin to negligence, in terms of burdens of proof, the
two approaches are substantially the same.
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occurred unless the product was defective.79 The malfunction theory
arose from the same basic premise of the res ipsa approach and the
inference of defect rule.
III. Current Trends: The Malfunction Theory
A. Evolution
In a products liability action under section 402A, proof of a de-
fect or defective condition in the product is an absolute necessity.80
The following three elements of proof are essential to a plaintiff's
prima facie case: (1) proof of a defect; (2) proof that the defective
product caused the plaintiff's injuries; and (3) proof that the product
was defective when it left the defendant's control. 8' It is often diffi-
cult to prove the existence of a specific defect.82 Because of the diffi-
culty in proving a defect directly, courts in many states allow cir-
cumstantial evidence to prove that a defect exists.83 Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of facts or circumstances that allow a rea-
sonable inference that is logically based on proven facts.84 The defect
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the
time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff;
and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it
was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
Id.
81. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Cf. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (The required elements of proof may be condensed
into two categories: (1) proof of a defect; and (2) proof that the defective product caused the
plaintiff's injuries.).
82. In some cases proof of a specific defect may be impossible, such as when the product
is totally destroyed. See, e.g., Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d 231
(1968) (beer bottle exploded); Lonon v. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack, 371 Pa. Super. 291,
538 A.2d 22 (1988) (battery exploded).
83. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 758 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.
1985); Wear v. Chenault Motor Co., 52 Ala. App. 382, 293 So. 2d 298, cert. denied, 292 Ala.
756, 293 So. 2d 301 (1974); Higgins v. General Motors Corp., 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741
(1985); Campbell v. Northern Signal Co., 103 111. App. 3d 154, 430 N.E.2d 670 (1981); Mays
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348 (1983); Virgil v. "Kash N' Karry" Serv.
Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984); Brothers v. General Motors Corp., 202 Mont.
477, 658 P.2d 1108 (1983); Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 90 N.M. 58,
559 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 37 Ohio St. 3d 1, 523 N.E.2d 489 (1988); Vanek v.
Kirby, 253 Or. 494, 450 P.2d 778 (1969); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa.
321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974).
84. See Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846
(Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977) (blowout in tire; evidence
not sufficient for inference of defect). Cf. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 18,
at 753 ("[C]ircumstantial evidence must exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair
amount of certainty. This does not mean, however, that it must negate all other possible
causes.").
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must be established by a preponderance of the evidence as the cause
of the accident that resulted in plaintiff's injuries.85
In cases in which proof of a defect is especially difficult, some
courts further extend the inference of defect drawn from circumstan-
tial evidence. Thus, a plaintiff may allege that the existence of the
malfunction of the product is circumstantial evidence that the prod-
uct was defective.86 This is the law in Pennsylvania. 87 The premise is
that the malfunction of the product enables a fact-finder to infer the
existence of a defect, 88 although the plaintiff still must satisfy the
other requirements of a cause of action under the strict liability the-
ory.89 The malfunction theory, as it was named by Pennsylvania
courts, only affects proof of defect, and has no bearing on proof of
causation or proof that the defect was present when the product left
the control of the manufacturer or seller.90
B. Application of the Malfunction Theory
The malfunction theory permits an inference that the product
was defective under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts without specific proof of a defect.91 Essentially, the occurrence
of a mechanical malfunction is evidence of a defective condition
without further proof of a specific defect in the product's design or
manufacturing process.92 There are various formulations of the mal-
function theory; all permit the jury to infer that the accident could
have happened only as a result of some defect in the product, even
though no specific defect was established. 93
85. Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d 615 (1982); Gottfried v. American
Can Co., 339 Pa. Super. 403, 489 A.2d 222 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Mortensen v. Chevron Chem. Co., 107 Idaho 836, 693 P.2d 1038 (1984);
MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
87. See Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989); MacDou-
gall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
88. See Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 329, 319 A.2d 914, 920
(1974).
89. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 37 Ohio St. 3d 1, 523
N.E.2d 489 (1988). It is uncertain whether the malfunction theory applies to breach of war-
ranty and negligence actions.
90. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
91. See Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 329, 319 A.2d 914, 920
(1974).
92. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D, at § 3.13 (1987) (The nature of
the product itself might be a factor supporting an inference of a defect at the time the product
left the manufacturer.).
93. See MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969); see
also Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'g Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), af'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d
Cir. 1969) (The plaintiff can establish a defective condition within § 402A by proving: that the
product functioned improperly, that there was no abnormal use, and that there were no reason-
able secondary causes for the accident.).
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Most jurisdictions recognizing the malfunction theory agree
that evidence of the happening of an event or an accident alone is
insufficient to establish a defect.9" At least three similar approaches
to the malfunction theory exist; the approaches merely differ in suffi-
ciency of evidence requirements.
The first approach, the strict construction approach, requires a
significant amount of proof that the defendant's product caused the
plaintiff's accident or injury.95 The plaintiff must prove that the
product did not perform as was intended and also must exclude all
possible causes of the accident that cannot be attributed to the de-
fendant."6 The plaintiff may do this by showing that he used the
product for its intended use and that there was no misuse of the
product; by referring to the age and expected useful life of the prod-
uct;97 by demonstrating that the product was in a good state of re-
pair;98 by examining the severity of the use; by showing the nature of
the malfunction; and by proving that the malfunction did not result
from any alteration of the product. 99
The strict construction approach forces the plaintiff to bear a
high burden of proof. Ruling out every other possible cause of the
accident or injury requires the plaintiff to submit considerably more
evidence of a defect than is required in the normal application of
section 402A. Although most would agree that proof of the accident
itself is not enough to indicate liability on the part of the manufac-
turer, 100 it appears that the strict construction would place too great
a burden on the plaintiff. Thus, most plaintiffs would fail to establish
a prima facie case under the strict construction of the malfunction
theory.
The second approach, the broad construction approach, requires
94. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gerry's Ridgewood, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d 780, 490 N.E.2d 987
(1986); Goodlow v. City of Alexandria, 407 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 1981); Woelfel v. Murphy
Ford Co., 337 Pa. Super. 433, 487 A.2d 23 (1985).
95. J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 9.02(2) (Essentially, the strict construction approach is
merely a modification of the inference of defect rule.).
96. Id.
97. The age of the product may be an extremely important evidentiary tool because it is
much easier to infer a defect when the product is relatively new. See Brandon v. Caterpillar
Tractor Corp., 125 A.D.2d 625, 510 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1986) (bulldozer was not relatively new,
and was subject to considerable wear and tear); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp:, 457
Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974) (age of the crane played an important role in the court's deci-
sion that the plaintiff had not established that the defect existed when the crane was sold by
the defendant).
98. See Brandon v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 125 A.D.2d 625, 510 N.Y.S.2d 165
(1986).
99. See J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 9.02(2).
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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minimal proof that the accident or injury was not caused by factors
other than a defect in the product at the time it was made. The only
requirement is that the plaintiff prove that a malfunction caused the
plaintiff's injuries. 101 The problem with the broad construction for-
mulation is quite apparent. Its lenient application reduces the plain-
tiff's burden of proof to the extent that little proof, other than proof
of a malfunction, is necessary. As a result, plaintiffs could make out
a prima facie case for strict liability in tort by simply pointing to an
injury caused by an alleged malfunction of the product. This overly
broad approach is impractical because it would allow plaintiffs to
flood courts with claims against manufacturers. In order to make the
malfunction theory fair and useful in litigation, some limitations on
the inference of a defect from evidence of a malfunction should be
imposed.
The third formulation, the Pennsylvania model or true malfunc-
tion theory, provides an alternative means of proving a defect in a
product by circumstantial evidence.102 From evidence of the mal-
function, an inference of a defective condition may be drawn. The
Pennsylvania approach imposes certain limitations on the implemen-
tation of the theory to prevent unnecessary abuse of the legal pro-
cess, which might result under the broad construction approach. The
plaintiff still bears the burden of proving that a defect exists, but
absent abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes, the malfunc-
tion of the product itself may be used as sufficient evidence of a de-
fect to make the existence of the defect a jury question. 1°o
Pennsylvania law explicitly holds that to establish a prima facie
case under the malfunction theory, abnormal use and reasonable sec-
ondary causes for the malfunction must not be present.104 At first
101. See J. ALLEE, supra note 5, at § 9.02(2).
102. For cases implementing the Pennsylvania approach, see Wojciechowski v. Long-
Airdox Div. of Marmom Group, Inc., 488 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Johnson &
Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989); Thompson v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 325
Pa. Super. 386, 473 A.2d 120 (1984).
103. See supra note 102. Some courts refer to the malfunction approach as a res ipsa
approach because both require the exclusion of reasonable secondary causes. See, e.g., Higgins
v. General Motors Corp., 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1986) (inferences that are the core
of the res ipsa doctrine are applicable to strict liability claim); Lang v. Federated Dep't Stores,
Inc., 161 Ga. App. 760, 287 S.E.2d 729 (1982). Cf. Brothers v. General Motors Corp., 207
Mont. 477, 658 P.2d 1108 (1983) (Generally, res ipsa loquitur is applied to human conduct
and not defective products.).
104. Evidence establishing a reasonable secondary cause precludes the inference of de-
fect under the malfunction doctrine. See Brief of Appellee, Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., at
15; Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 368 Pa. Super. 109, 533 A.2d 739 (1987), rev'd
and remanded, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989). The plaintiff must present a case-in-chief, free of
secondary causes. Rogers, 565 A.2d at 755. Cf. Mortensen v. Chevron Chem. Co., 107 Idaho
836, 693 P.2d 1038 (1984).
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blush it appears that a defendant may easily defeat the malfunction
theory by pointing to any other possible cause of the product's mal-
function. Courts, however, are careful to limit other causes to signifi-
cant or reasonable secondary causes. 10 5 Thus, a defendant cannot
point to causes with no factual or theoretical basis. Reasonable sec-
ondary causes may include human error such as negligence or some
type of human intervention,10 ' normal wear and tear,10 7 and other
intervening factors that could have caused the plaintiff's injury.108
The plaintiff is not required to rule out every possible cause,10 9 but
he must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defect evidenced by the malfunction caused his injuries.110 The bur-
den of proving that there was no abnormal use of the allegedly de-
fective product is not difficult to meet. Common sense dictates what
constitutes abnormal use of a product."'
Pennsylvania is the forerunner in the development and imple-
mentation of the malfunction theory. The malfunction theory
emerged in Pennsylvania only three years after Pennsylvania
105. See, e.g., Wojciechowski v. Long-Airdox Div. of Marmom Group, Inc., 488 F.2d
1111 (3d Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 368 Pa. Super. 109, 533 A.2d
739 (1987), rev'd and remanded, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989); Sim v. General Motors Corp., 751
P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).
106. See, e.g., Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 368 Pa. Super. 109, 533 A.2d
739 (1987) rev'd and remanded, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989); Thompson v. Anthony Crane
Rental, Inc., 325 Pa. Super. 386, 473 A.2d 120 (1984).
107. Wear and tear and age of the product deserve considerable attention as they can
render a product that was not defective at the time it was manufactured, unreasonably danger-
ous. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
108. If conditions other than the defect might equally establish plausible causes for the
accident, then the jury's selection of only one cause can only be speculation or conjecture. See
Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974) (allegedly defec-
tive crane was substantially altered and used for various purposes).
109. A problem arises when the plaintiff invokes the malfunction theory because he can-
not point to a specific defect and the product was made by numerous manufacturers. For
example, a plaintiff will be unable to name a specific defendant unless he can identify which
product component malfunctioned. Possible solutions may include comparative fault or pro
rata liability.
110. See Lenkiewicz v. Lange, 242 Pa. Super. 87, 92, 363 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1976)
(when both an explanation consistent with the defect and one inconsistent with the defect
exist, and both are of equal probability, the plaintiff has not met his burden of excluding
reasonable secondary causes).
111. Abnormal use includes altering the product for use in unintended ways, using the
product in direct disregard of the operating instructions, and using the product in an abnormal
manner. See Beetler v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 431 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1970) (misapplication of
permanent wave solution for hair); Barrett v. Atlas Powder Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 560, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 339 (1978) (detonating thirty-year old blasting caps by connecting them to a car bat-
tery); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348 (1983) (failure to follow instruc-
tions pertaining to installation of pipeline); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J.
177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964) (possible misuse of abrasive disc and operation at excessive speed
defeated the malfunction theory).
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adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.112 The
malfunction theory originated in MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co." 3
and Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co.11 4 Many other jurisdictions
use the malfunction theory or a similar approach. 15
C. Limitations
In a strict liability action, the malfunction theory allows a de-
fect to be inferred from circumstantial evidence of a malfunction
when no other reasonable explanation for the injury exists.116 Since
factfinding is based on inferences from circumstantial evidence, ju-
rors may be confused in applying the malfunction theory. To allevi-
ate the confusion, Pennsylvania formulated a standard jury instruc-
tion on the malfunction theory.1 '7 Other jurisdictions that recognize
the malfunction doctrine are expected to adopt similar instructions.
Pennsylvania's instruction informs the jury that proof of a defect
may be inferred from a product malfunction. 18 The instruction
states that the plaintiff must prove: (1) a malfunction; (2) that the
product was "given only normal or anticipated usage prior to the
accident;" and (3) "that no reasonable secondary causes were re-
sponsible for the accident." 1 9 This form of instruction effectively
limits jury confusion about the proper application of the malfunction
doctrine.
112. Pennsylvania adopted § 402A in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
113. 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969) (a malfunction of machinery in the ab-
sence of abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes is evidence of a defective condition
within the meaning of § 402A).
114. 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), afitd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
115. States that have implemented a malfunction-type theory include: Alabama (res
ipsa language); Arkansas (plaintiff must negate possible causes attributable to defendant);
California (similar to Pennsylvania model); Georgia (inferences essential to res ipsa are appli-
cable to strict products liability); Illinois (approach's language refers to circumstantial evi-
dence, but the courts' interpretations speak of reasonable secondary causes); Kansas (similar
to Pennsylvania model); Missouri (similar to Pennsylvania model); Maryland (similar to Penn-
sylvania model); New Jersey (similar to Pennsylvania model); New York (similar to Pennsyl-
vania model); Ohio (analogous to Pennsylvania model); and Wyoming (analogous to Pennsyl-
vania approach).
116. If there are reasonable causes of the malfunction other than the alleged defect, the
malfunction theory may not apply. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. The malfunc-
tion theory probably would not be helpful when a plaintiff alleges only negligence or breach of
warranty. Although proof of a defect is important under these theories, the plaintiff still must
satisfy all other requirements for a prima facie case including negligence and existence of a
warranty.
117. See Lonon v. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack, 371 Pa. Super. 291, 538 A.2d 22, 26
(1988); Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions § 8.05 (1981).
118. See Lonon v. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack, 371 Pa. Super. 291, 538 A.2d 22, 26
(1988); Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions § 8.05 (1981).
119. See Lonon v. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack, 371 Pa. Super. 291, 538 A.2d 22, 26
(1988); Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions § 8.05 (1981).
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The language of the special jury instruction and the doctrine
itself indicate that the malfunction doctrine does not apply in cases
in which there are reasonable secondary causes for the malfunction.
The language seems to imply that a plaintiff cannot theoretically
submit to the jury both the malfunction theory, based on strict liabil-
ity, and negligence as grounds for recovery. The malfunction theory
and the negligence theory appear to be inconsistent theories. Thus,
charging the jury with both theories in the same case may confuse
the jury or cause the misapplication of the malfunction doctrine. 2 °
Similarly, the language of the malfunction theory that restricts
abnormal use and excludes reasonable secondary causes contradicts
the negligence doctrine, in which the plaintiff must point to negli-
gence, a reasonable secondary cause, to establish a prima facie case.
When a plaintiff proceeds on both of these theories, negligence and
strict liability utilizing the malfunction doctrine, it seems that negli-
gence itself constitutes a reasonable secondary cause, which renders
the malfunction theory inapplicable to prove the existence of a de-
fect. To allow a plaintiff proceeding under the malfunction theory to
argue that the evidence is sufficient to infer a defect and to rule out
reasonable secondary causes while simultaneously proceeding under
a negligence theory is contrary to the purpose of the malfunction
doctrine.' z The malfunction doctrine aims to provide a means for
plaintiffs to prove a defect in cases in which a malfunction can only
be explained by a defect; the malfunction theory should not apply in
those cases in which other explanations exist.' 22
The Pennsylvania courts twice faced the issue of inconsistent
theories of liability. In Thompson v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 2 '
120.
We fully recognize that in most circumstances, both a strict liability claim
and a regular negligence claim can be alleged, proven, and submitted to a jury
in a case . . . . However, in cases like the instant one, where the plaintiff's strict
liability case depends not upon the actual proof of a defect, but only upon the
mere occurrence of a malfunction, it is inconsistent to permit him to proceed on
the strict liability ground where he also advances a theory of human intervention
which purportedly caused the harm.
Thompson v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 325 Pa. Super. 386, 396, 473 A.2d 120, 125 (1984);
see also Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 368 Pa. Super. 109, 533 A.2d 739 (1987),
rev'd and remanded, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989).
121. In negligence cases, the plaintiff must argue to the jury that the evidence is suffi-
cient to establish another cause of the malfunction such as breach of duty by a third party.
Negligence would constitute a reasonable secondary cause in such cases, and if such negli-
gence is determined to constitute a superseding intervening cause the malfunction theory
should not be submitted to the jury.
122. See Brief for Appellee, at 41-42, Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751
(Pa. 1989).
123. 325 Pa. Super. 386, 473 A.2d 120 (1984).
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the boom of a crane struck an electrical wire and injured the plain-
tiff.12 The plaintiff brought a products liability action, alleging both
negligence and strict liability. 12 5 The jury was charged on both the
negligence count and the malfunction theory.126 The jury found that
the crane was defective by an inference derived from the malfunc-
tion theory. 2 7 In addition, the jury determined that negligence was a
factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. 2 "
Holding that it was error to submit both counts to the jury, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that the malfunction doc-
trine was inapplicable since there was evidence of a reasonable sec-
ondary cause."' Nevertheless, the court characterized the error as
harmless because the issues of strict liability and negligence were
submitted to the jury in separate special interrogatories.'1 0 Despite
the appellant's argument that charging the jury on both issues was
reversible error because the theories are mutually exclusive,' 1 the
court simply modified the verdict to represent only the amount allo-
cated for the negligence claim, rather than granting a new trial.
132
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently decided a similar
issue in Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc.,'33 which in-
volved both a negligence claim (medical malpractice) and a mal-
function theory strict liability claim. The plaintiff suffered second
and third degree burns on his leg after his leg was put in a plaster
cast manufactured by Johnson and Johnson.13 ' Because he could not
point to any specific defect in the cast, the plaintiff proceeded on the
malfunction theory. The plaintiff also alleged that the hospital was
negligent, 3 5 although plaintiff's counsel made no effort to prove neg-
ligence at trial. 36
124. Id. at 390, 473 A.2d at 123.
125. Id. at 395, 473 A.2d at 125.
126. Id.
127. Thompson v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 325 Pa. Super. 386, 394, 473 A.2d 120,
123 (1984).
128. The jury's response to special interrogatories indicated that negligence was a factor
in causing the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 397, 473 A.2d at 126.
129. Id. at 395, 473 A.2d at 125 (In cases in which the plaintiff's strict liability claim
depends upon the occurrence of the malfunction, it is inconsistent to permit him to proceed on
the strict liability theory when he also advances a negligence claim.).
130. Id. at 396, 473 A.2d at 125-26.
131. Id. at 397, 473 A.2d at 126 (1984).
132. Thompson v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 325 Pa. Super. 386, 400, 473 A.2d 120,
128 (1984).
133. 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989).
134. Id. at 752.
135. Id.
136. Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 368 Pa. Super. 109, 114 n.6, 533 A.2d
739, 755 n.6 (1987), rev'd and remanded, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989).
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Realizing that pursuing both the malfunction theory claim,
which requires the exclusion of other reasonable secondary causes,
and a negligence claim might be problematic, the plaintiff submitted
evidence to support the malfunction claim and left proof of negli-
gence to the defendant."3 7 Although the jury was instructed that if it
found for the plaintiff on the strict liability theory it should not con-
sider the negligence theory, the superior court held that submitting
the strict liability claim to the jury in the "presence of sufficient evi-
dence of negligence as a cause of the malfunction" was erroneous.' 38
The holding reflects the court's belief that the malfunction theory
and the negligence theory are mutually exclusive and inconsistent.
139
The court reasoned that a plaintiff cannot use the malfunction the-
ory to evidence a defect and simultaneously point to another reason-
able secondary cause of the occurrence, such as negligence. 40
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the superior court,
characterizing the logic of the superior court as circular because it
mandated the grant of a directed verdict when the defendant pro-
duced credible evidence of reasonable secondary causes.' 4 Believing
that the lower court's sweeping conclusion was too broad, the su-
preme court recognized that in some instances a plaintiff may pro-
ceed upon both malfunction and negligence theories so long as the
negligence is not a supervening cause of the malfunction.' 42
At first blush it appears that the malfunction theory and negli-
gence are not mutually exclusive and inconsistent. The court, how-
ever, did not explicitly hold that a plaintiff may proceed under both
theories and submit both issues to the jury. Apparently, the court did
not focus on the question of the apparent exclusivity of the theories,
but rather, it directed its attention to the particular facts and proce-
dural aspects of Rogers.
In Rogers, the plaintiffs alleged both negligence and strict lia-
bility but, throughout the trial, only pursued the malfunction theory
claim. 43 This is the basis for the supreme court's holding that "so
long as the plaintiffs presented a case-in-chief free of secondary
causes which justified the inferences of defect in the product, the
137. Id. at 128, 533 A.2d at 749.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 126, 533 A.2d at 748 ("When there is enough evidence that the malfunction
was caused by negligence of a third party to warrant submitting a negligence cause of action
against the third party to the jury, the plaintiff cannot have met its burden.").
140. Id.
141. Rogers & Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751, 754 (Pa. i989).
142. Id. at 755.
143. Id. at 755 & n.6.
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jury was free to accept their scenario." 1" Essentially, a plaintiff may
plead both negligence and the malfunction theory, but may not ad-
vance both at trial. Thus, proving negligence of a third party or the
plaintiff falls upon the defendant manufacturer. Effectively, a plain-
tiff may not, in his case-in-chief, advance both the negligence and
malfunction theory when the negligence could be a supervening
cause of the malfunction. The defendant manufacturer, however,
may attempt to prove negligence to defeat the malfunction theory. 4"
D. Defenses
A variety of viable defenses exist to combat the malfunction
theory. Some defenses aim to prove an abnormal use of the product,
some show that other reasonable secondary causes exist, and others
focus on the plaintiff's actions.
1 46
Assumption of risk is a viable defense in a strict products liabil-
ity action under section 402A. Assumption of risk may be a com-
plete defense to a strict liability action if the defendant shows that
the plaintiff knew of the defective condition and voluntarily and un-
reasonably used the product.14 Thus, the manufacturer is not forced
to act as insurer of his product and may rely upon the belief that the
product will be used in the usual manner.148 Otherwise, to allow a
plaintiff to recover when he knowingly assumed a risk of injury
would result in a windfall for the plaintiff.
Misuse of a product may also constitute a viable defense.149 Evi-
dence tending to show misuse or misapplication of a product may be
a substantial negating factor in proof of a defect. The defense of
misuse is common in cases involving plaintiffs injured by beauty
products, especially hair treatments or permanent wave solutions. '
Concurrent abnormal use may also be a defense to the malfunc-
tion theory.16 1 Concurrent abnormal use suggests that negligence or
144. Id. at 755.
145. A defendant manufacturer has three plausible evidentiary approaches in its case-in-
chief: (1) it can contest the occurrence of the malfunction; (2) present evidence of abnormal
use; and (3) it can present evidence establishing reasonable secondary causes. Id. at 754.
146. These defenses include assumption of risk and intentional misuse.
147. See Lonon v. Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack, 371 Pa. Super. 291, 298, 538 A.2d
22, 25 (1988).
148. See id. at 299-300, 538 A.2d at 25.
149. See Beetler v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 431 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1970) (permanent wave
solution not used strictly as intended).
150. Id. See also Lang v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 760, 287 S.E.2d
729 (1982).
151. See Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974)
(crane operator exiting the cab while a load was suspended contributed to plaintiffs injuries
and constituted concurrent abnormal use).
THE MALFUNCTION THEORY
some type of intentional wrongdoing occurred.' 52 The occurrence of
negligence or an intentional tort may detract from the plaintiff's at-
tempt to exclude all other reasonable secondary causes of the mal-
function and all possibilities of abnormal use.'53 If the negligence or
abnormal use contributed to the malfunction, application of the mal-
function doctrine would be foreclosed. 54 If, however, the concurrent
abnormal use or wrongdoing did not affect, cause, or encourage the
malfunction of the product, inference of the defective condition
would not be foreclosed.155 Any other evidence tending to negate the
essential elements of the malfunction doctrine may serve as a de-
fense and thus prevent the inference of a defective condition in the
product. Plausible theories of defense are limited only by the imagi-
nation and strategy of the defense lawyer.
IV. Conclusion
The malfunction doctrine affords a plaintiff his day in court in
cases in which proof of a defect is extremely difficult and traditional
legal theories do not adequately accommodate the injured plaintiff.
Under the malfunction theory, a factfinder may infer that a product
is defective from circumstantial evidence of the malfunction of the
product and without direct proof of a specific defect.
At first blush, the malfunction doctrine might appear extremely
plaintiff-oriented and detrimental to the manufacturer or seller of
those products that allegedly malfunction and injure consumers.
Upon close inspection of the doctrine, the theory behind it, and its
implementation in American jurisdictions, it becomes clear that the
malfunction theory enables a plaintiff to prove his case in court with-
out imposing any significant burden on the manufacturer. Other
than proof of defect, the malfunction theory does not change any
other aspect of section 402A in a strict liability claim. 5 " Instead, it
simply expands the use of circumstantial evidence to prove a defect
and allows the injured plaintiff to use the product's malfunction as
evidence of the defect.
Substantial limitations restrict the use of the malfunction as evi-
152. See id.
153. Id. at 321, 319 A.2d 914.
154. Id. at 330, 319 A.2d at 920. But see Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 565
A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989). It is possible that a plaintiffs injuries could be caused jointly by a
defective product and negligence so long as the negligence is not a supervening cause of the
malfunction. Id. at 755.
155. Brief for Appellee, at 18-19, Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 368 Pa. Super. 109,
533 A.2d 739 (1987), rev'd and remanded, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989).
156. See Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974).
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dence of a defect. The plaintiff cannot simply meet his burden of
proof by pointing to the product's malfunction. The plaintiff also
must negate any other reasonable secondary causes of the accident
and any abnormal use of the product. 157 Although a plaintiff may
allege both negligence of a third party and the malfunction theory,
he cannot present evidence supporting both theories in his case-in-
chief.158 Preventing the plaintiff from simultaneously advancing both
theories reduces the likelihood that a jury might become confused
when a plaintiff proceeds on both theories. Various defenses are
available to prevent the application of the malfunction doctrine.
The malfunction doctrine has great potential in products liabil-
ity cases. It provides a fair and reasonable means for the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case in strict liability in tort when no specific
defect can be identified. The potential for abuse, or for reducing the
plaintiff's burden of proof so significantly as to result in a windfall is
minimal, since states such as Pennsylvania narrowly limit application
of the malfunction doctrine. The Pennsylvania model has benefitted
plaintiffs in the State for twenty years.1 59 Other states followed this
trend and broadened the use of circumstantial evidence to suggest a
defective condition in the product. Although often challenged, the
malfunction doctrine significantly benefits tort law and induces man-
ufacturers to produce and distribute safer products.
Sharon M. Peart
157. Negating other reasonable secondary causes may be difficult if many other people
were involved in the accident, such as when an accident occurs in a workplace, or when negli-
gence might be a factor. See, e.g., Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348
(1983); Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 368 Pa. Super. 109, 533 A.2d 739 (1987),
rev'd and remanded, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1989).
158. See Rogers, 565 A.2d at 751.
159. See supra note 8.
